Only seven people have been convicted in military tribunals between 2001 & 2010—and two of them are already free, including Salim Hamdan, bin Laden’s driver. Federal criminal courts provide a more effective, tougher, and principled response to the threat of terrorism—far more than military tribunals. Those who argue otherwise are ignoring the record of the last ten years.
This “Making the Case” memo explains why federal courts—not military tribunals—are the most effective way to bring terrorists to justice.
Only seven people have been convicted in military tribunals between 2001 & 2010—two of them are already free, including Salim Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s driver. Our newest memo will help you make the case for we should keep terrorists in the federal court system instead of in a military legal limbo.
Is dealing with Russia the lesser of two evils on Afghanistan and Syria? This Infographic explains.
The major road out of Afghanistan (the Khyber Pass in Pakistan) has been closed since December 2011, after American forces killed 24 Pakistani troops in a border skirmish. Consequently, the U.S. must use the much more expensive and lengthy Northern Distribution Network—which requires permission of many former Soviet states, including Russia.
The exit from Afghanistan is underway, but the debate continues over whether it’s moving too slowly, too quickly, or just about right. President Obama has charted a responsible path to ending our combat role in Afghanistan while maintaining our ability to eliminate future threats. Why?
Tonight Third Way is hosting a reception celebrating the publication of Find, Fix, Finish - an important new book by Eric Rosenbach and our very own Aki Peritz.
About Find, Fix, Finish:
On 9/11 the U.S. had effectively no counterterrorism doctrine. Fast forward ten years: Osama bin Laden is dead; al Qaeda is organizationally ruined and pinned in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan; there has been no major attack on American soil; and while there has been at least one instance of a massive planned attack, it was crushed by the greatest international collaboration of intelligence services seen since the end of the Cold War. It’s been a remarkable transformation.
Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach have experienced first-hand the monumental strategy changes in our country’s counterterrorism strategy within the intelligence, defense, and political communities. In this book, they explain how America learned to be very good at taking on the terrorists, often one at a time, in ever more lethally incisive operations. They offer new details behind some headlines from the last decade. They are frank about the mistakes that have been made. And they explain how a concept coined by General Grant during the Civil War has been reinvented in the age of satellite technology to manage a globally distributed foe, allowing the U.S. to find, fix, and finish its enemies.
8 weeks. That’s how long a cop in Afghanistan gets for basic training. Compare that to what a trainee receives in Philadelphia (30 weeks), Baltimore County (27 weeks), or DC (24 weeks). And your average Afghan police officer can’t read at a 1st grade level.
Local police are often the first (and occasionally the last) line of defense against violent extremism in places like Afghanistan. But corrupt, ill-trained police can actually spur violence and cause local citizens to turn away from the government.
That’s why Congress shouldn’t cut foreign aid pegged to training foreign police forces. If we can help citizens abroad, it will inevitably help protect citizens here at home.
Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has waged a relentless campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the central al Qaeda network and kill or capture its senior leaders. By removing key al Qaeda personnel from the battlefield, the U.S. and its allies have largely kept the group off-balance. While we cannot be complacent about the threat, our efforts have degraded the group’s overall ability to plan and carry out attacks here at home. We have highlighted some of the top al Qaeda figures killed or captured by U.S. or allied forces in the decade since the 9/11 attacks.