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Making the Case: How to Respond to Critics on the Boston Marathon Bombings

Critics call for Dzhokhar Tsarnaev to be treated as an enemy combatant, but this is ill-informed and counterproductive because:

  • The Boston Marathon Bombers don’t fit the enemy combatant definition;
  • Labeling them enemy combatants throws the case into legal limbo; and
  • Law enforcement has a proven record of handling terrorism cases.

Our newest Making the Case memo offers recommendations on how to respond to criticism aimed at law enforcement and the Administration since the arrest of Dzhokhar Tsarnaev. 

READ: Making the Case: How to Respond to Critics on the Boston Marathon Bombings

Making the Case: Why We Should Try Terrorists in Federal Courts

Only seven people have been convicted in military tribunals between 2001 & 2010—and two of them are already free, including Salim Hamdan, bin Laden’s driver. Federal criminal courts provide a more effective, tougher, and principled response to the threat of terrorism—far more than military tribunals. Those who argue otherwise are ignoring the record of the last ten years. 

This “Making the Case” memo explains why federal courts—not military tribunals—are the most effective way to bring terrorists to justice.

READ:  Making the Case: Why We Should Try Terrorists in Federal Courts

Counterterrorism Expert Aki Peritz Discusses Hunt For Boston Marathon Bombing Suspects

WASHINGTON (WUSA9) — Was it domestic terrorism, international terrorism, or could a lone bomber be responsible? Those are key questions now for the FBI after the Boston Marathon bombings.

Aki Peritz, a counter terrorism expert and author of “Find, Fix, Finish: Inside the Counterterrorism campaigns that killed Bin Laden and devastated Al Qaeda,” talked to us on Tuesday afternoon.

Peritz told us, “We have to allow the professionals in the law enforcement community to make their decisions and not do it hastily. What we saw in previous instances was that people jumped the gun. People came to conclusions too fast. That’s not something we want to do in such a high profile case like this.”

He described some of the first steps law enforcement takes in the aftermath of this tragedy and others like it: “One of the things is we’re going to have law enforcement sort of make sure the area is secure. They’re going to have very, very trained individuals go through the crime scene and look for evidence. The next thing they’re going to do is they’re going to work with both federal, state and local organizations to determine whether there is a domestic nexus or international nexus. As you know, the government has not actually said who they think is culpable for this attack….we’re going to see this played out over the next couple of days or maybe weeks.”

Pertiz does not think law enforcement knows who is responsible for the attacks yet. “If they knew, let’s say, a terrorist organization that was a foreign terrorist organization, they would have said something by now. I think the smart thing to do is to let the law enforcement folks and the intelligence folks do their business, because this is what they’ve been doing for the last 10 years.”

We asked Peritz is he was surprised that something like this could happen at a Boston Marathon. His reply: “Not at all. The Boston Marathon is obviously a very high profile American event.  A lot of people are there. Cameras are there. The media is there. And if Iwere a terrorist, I would want to attack something like this.”

About moving forward from the frightening experience, Peritz said, “The more important issue is looking at things through a prism of resilience. These things will happen, but we are a resilient nation and we will continue forward. At the end of the day, terrorists are not going to collapse American civilization. Only we have that power.”

Making the Case: Why We Should Try Terrorists in Federal Courts

Only seven people have been convicted in military tribunals between 2001 & 2010—two of them are already free, including Salim Hamdan, Osama bin Laden’s driver. Our newest memo will help you make the case for we should keep terrorists in the federal court system instead of in a military legal limbo.

READ: Making the Case: Why We Should Try Terrorists in Federal Courts

Fighting al Qaeda in the Post-bin Laden Era

By Aki Peritz

Chadian soldiers assisted by Malian gendarmes, patrol the streets of Gao, Northern Mali, Monday Jan. 28, 2013.

It’s welcome news to hear French and Malian troops have almost fully liberated northern Mali from al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, known as AQIM, and the other jihadists who turned much of the country into a neo-Taliban state. Let’s take this opportunity to reflect on how to wage war against al Qaeda in the post-Osama bin Laden era.

1. Let our allies shoulder the security burden.

For more than a decade, the United States has led the world’s efforts to crush al Qaeda. But let’s be honest: The United States has little experience in the vast, lawless Sahel, despite the much-ballyhooed stand-up of the Pentagon’s Africa Command a few years ago. America’s knowledge of the region remains sparse—chances are you can probably count the number of Bambara or Tuareg speakers in the U.S. government on one hand, if you lop off a few fingers.

Other allies—most notably France, but also Great Britain—know more about the region, the turf, and locals than we ever will. And remember: French and Malian soldiers are doing the fighting, the killing, and the dying. So in this fight, America should support them and provide them with assistance: reconnaissance drones, advanced munitions, refueling capacity, intelligence support—you name it.

They certainly need it. In this hot war, Paris has struggled to move men and materiel to the front lines. And Mali’s army is beset by numerous problems. But let’s not criticize our allies; now is the time to help them. After all, if we can hammer another nail into the coffin of an al Qaeda franchise, it’s certainly worth leasing France a few more C-17s.

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Advancing Against Al Qaeda Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has waged a relentless campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the central al Qaeda network and kill or capture its senior leaders. By removing key al Qaeda personnel from the battlefield, the U.S. and its allies have largely kept the group off-balance. While we cannot be complacent about the threat, our efforts have degraded the group’s overall ability to plan and carry out attacks here at home. In this graphic, we have highlighted some of the top al Qaeda figures killed or captured by U.S. or allied forces in the decade since the 9/11 attacks. 

Advancing Against Al Qaeda

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has waged a relentless campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the central al Qaeda network and kill or capture its senior leaders. By removing key al Qaeda personnel from the battlefield, the U.S. and its allies have largely kept the group off-balance. While we cannot be complacent about the threat, our efforts have degraded the group’s overall ability to plan and carry out attacks here at home.

In this graphic, we have highlighted some of the top al Qaeda figures killed or captured by U.S. or allied forces in the decade since the 9/11 attacks. 

How Critics of Obama’s Libya Response Profoundly Misunderstand Intelligence

Agencies still don’t have all the facts about what went down in Benghazi, and interpreting them correctly will take time, a former CIA analyst explains.

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High-profile Republican politicians and their media surrogates are accusing President Obama and other top White House staff of “lying” to the public about last month’s deadly assault on America’s diplomatic post in Benghazi, Libya.

This accusation not only misses the mark but also demonstrates how profoundly the accusers misunderstand how intelligence works. In fact, the White House’s evolving timeline for what happened in Benghazi is proof of precisely the opposite of what the breathless accusers suggest — it is a sign of a normal, healthy intelligence process.

To believe that the initial statements about what happened in Benghazi were a lie, one has to assume: (1) The administration had all the facts, even as the situation was evolving; (2) the administration chose to tell a deliberately false story about those facts; and (3) the story it told was consistent, with no administration official contradicting the official line. There is little evidence to support any of these three pillars of the Republican case against the White House.

To be clear, I don’t have access to the raw or finished intelligence detailing the particulars of the Benghazi investigation. (If I did, I wouldn’t be writing this.) But I did serve as a CIA analyst during the Bush Administration, and I authored dozens of finished products on terrorists and their strategies. I have seen how this process works. When intelligence from a conflict zone is assessed, the results are not clear, linear, or static. Rather, 21st-century intelligence analysis — particularly when it is occurring in real-time and on something high-profile — can be messy, obtuse and, above all, evolving.

So, here are four facts about intelligence analysis to consider before accusing any president (regardless of party) of lying during a crisis:

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Afghanistan: Understanding the Administration’s Transition Strategy

The exit from Afghanistan is underway, but the debate continues over whether it’s moving too slowly, too quickly, or just about right. President Obama has charted a responsible path to ending our combat role in Afghanistan while maintaining our ability to eliminate future threats. Why?

In our newest digest, we explain:

  • Why the President’s transition plan is ending the combat mission as quickly as is logistically possible;
  • Why a faster withdrawal timeline could imperil U.S. security interests;
  • Why making our objective a Taliban surrender could extend the U.S. combat mission by decades; and
  • How the current plan and security agreement provides for U.S. security interests going forward.

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has waged a relentless campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the central al Qaeda network and kill or capture its senior leaders. By removing key al Qaeda personnel from the battlefield, the U.S. and its allies have largely kept the group off-balance. While we cannot be complacent about the threat, our efforts have degraded the group’s overall ability to plan and carry out attacks here at home. In this infographic, we have highlighted some of the top al Qaeda figures killed or captured by U.S. or allied forces in the decade since the 9/11 attacks.  

Since September 11, 2001, the U.S. has waged a relentless campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat the central al Qaeda network and kill or capture its senior leaders. By removing key al Qaeda personnel from the battlefield, the U.S. and its allies have largely kept the group off-balance. While we cannot be complacent about the threat, our efforts have degraded the group’s overall ability to plan and carry out attacks here at home.

In this infographic, we have highlighted some of the top al Qaeda figures killed or captured by U.S. or allied forces in the decade since the 9/11 attacks.  

Politico’s Morning Defense on our National Security Focus Group Report

Politico’s Morning Defense chatted over the weekend with Mieke Eoyang, director of the national security program here at Third Way. Last month we released the findings (http://bit.ly/H7EgXp) of a series of focus groups it held with swing voters in Ohio and Florida.

Among the conclusions: Participants viewed Obama in a positive light on national security, but the president’s strength on the issue did not transfer to congressional Democrats, who are viewed as weak and indecisive.

“When you talk about stereotypes for each party, we had people bringing up things from Vietnam,” Eoyang said. “There has been a long history of Democrats with one stereotype — very dovish.”

Since 2008, she added, the president’s marks on national security have improved, but “party perceptions have not shifted at all.”

Another key finding: Among focus-group participants, women largely viewed Democrats as better on defense, while men overwhelmingly preferred Republicans. “What we found in the focus groups was that women were really trusting of the president to handle the hard security issues,” Eoyang said. “I think that a lot of that comes from the president’s willingness to consult with the military and to be deliberative.”

For more from the interview — including the participants’ views on drones, the defense budget and TSA screenings — scroll to the end.

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Tonight Third Way is hosting a reception celebrating the publication of Find, Fix, Finish - an important new book by Eric Rosenbach and our very own Aki Peritz. About Find, Fix, Finish:  On 9/11 the U.S. had effectively no counterterrorism doctrine. Fast forward ten years: Osama bin Laden is dead; al Qaeda is organizationally ruined and pinned in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan; there has been no major attack on American soil; and while there has been at least one instance of a massive planned attack, it was crushed by the greatest international collaboration of intelligence services seen since the end of the Cold War. It’s been a remarkable transformation. Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach have experienced first-hand the monumental strategy changes in our country’s counterterrorism strategy within the intelligence, defense, and political communities. In this book, they explain how America learned to be very good at taking on the terrorists, often one at a time, in ever more lethally incisive operations. They offer new details behind some headlines from the last decade. They are frank about the mistakes that have been made. And they explain how a concept coined by General Grant during the Civil War has been reinvented in the age of satellite technology to manage a globally distributed foe, allowing the U.S. to find, fix, and finish its enemies. You can purchase your very own copy via Amazon.com.

Tonight Third Way is hosting a reception celebrating the publication of Find, Fix, Finish - an important new book by Eric Rosenbach and our very own Aki Peritz.

About Find, Fix, Finish: 

On 9/11 the U.S. had effectively no counterterrorism doctrine. Fast forward ten years: Osama bin Laden is dead; al Qaeda is organizationally ruined and pinned in the tribal areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan; there has been no major attack on American soil; and while there has been at least one instance of a massive planned attack, it was crushed by the greatest international collaboration of intelligence services seen since the end of the Cold War. It’s been a remarkable transformation.

Aki Peritz and Eric Rosenbach have experienced first-hand the monumental strategy changes in our country’s counterterrorism strategy within the intelligence, defense, and political communities. In this book, they explain how America learned to be very good at taking on the terrorists, often one at a time, in ever more lethally incisive operations. They offer new details behind some headlines from the last decade. They are frank about the mistakes that have been made. And they explain how a concept coined by General Grant during the Civil War has been reinvented in the age of satellite technology to manage a globally distributed foe, allowing the U.S. to find, fix, and finish its enemies.

You can purchase your very own copy via Amazon.com.

International Cops on the Front Lines of Fighting Terrorism

8 weeks. That’s how long a cop in Afghanistan gets for basic training. Compare that to what a trainee receives in Philadelphia (30 weeks), Baltimore County (27 weeks), or DC (24 weeks). And your average Afghan police officer can’t read at a 1st grade level.

Local police are often the first (and occasionally the last) line of defense against violent extremism in places like Afghanistan. But corrupt, ill-trained police can actually spur violence and cause local citizens to turn away from the government.

That’s why Congress shouldn’t cut foreign aid pegged to training foreign police forces. If we can help citizens abroad, it will inevitably help protect citizens here at home.

Read the new Idea Brief from the Third Way National Security Program, “International Cops on the Front Lines of Fighting Terrorism.”